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EU Merger Control Regulation No 4064/89 tended to rely on a dominance test, based on the 
market share of undertakings, to indicate the level and potential changes in market power. The 
use of such in differentiated product industries is questionable. New EC Merger Regulation 
No 139/2004 introduces a substantive test to ensure that all post-merger scenarios posing a 
threat to competition, even amongst small undertakings, are detected. We propose the use of a 
simple structural approach to undertake a substantive test. We illustrate our point over 28 
periods, 178 products (13 companies), for Retail Carbonated Soft Drinks. We estimate 
company (product) mark-ups using a “simple” Nested Logit model, Berry (1994) and a more 
“sophisticated” model, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). While the dominance test may 
fail to identify damaging mergers in differentiated products industries, this technique will not.  
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and John Sutton for comments on work that this policy paper is based on. 1 Introduction
EU Merger Control Regulation No 4064/89, covering the period 1990-2003,
tended to rely on a dominance test, based on the market share of undertakings,
to indicate the level and potential changes in market power in the market.
After deﬁning the relevant product and geographic market, deﬁn e di nt e r m so f
demand side substitutability, high concentration (measured by the Herﬁndal-
Hirschmann Index (HHI) on company output (sales)) was taken to indicate a
lack of competitive pressure in the market.1 The HHI was considered a good
indicator of market power in homogeneous goods industries. Thresholds based
on the level and changes in the HHI due to a merger provided the Commission
with screening rules on whether the merger justiﬁes investigation.2 Thresholds
are outlined in Table I.
HHI (post-merger)      Change in HHI as a result of merger  
A:  Not likely to have adverse competitive effects*  
Less than 1000      Any 
Between 1000 and 2000    Less than 250  
Above  2000     Less  than  150 
B:  Significant competitive concerns 
Between 1000 and 2000    Greater than 250   
Above 2000        Greater than 150 
Table I: EC Screening Thresholds
A post-merger HHI of less than 1000 are unlikely to be investigated.3 Merg-
ers leading to a HHI of between 1000 and 2000 and an increase in HHI greater
1The HHI is the sum of the squares of ﬁrm percentage market share, which gives propor-
tionately greater weight to larger players in the market. It ranges from close to zero (in an
atomistic market) to 10000 (in the case of monopoly).
2The post-merger HHI assumes the current market shares of the merging parties remains
the same. This does not allow for strategic reaction in terms of quantity, price and non-price
competition, entry or exit. The change in the HHI can be calculated simply by doubling the
product of the market shares of the merging ﬁrms. This just assesses a problematic merger
in terms of two companies coming together with ex-ante market power (market shares).
3There are exceptions to these A rules.
(i) If a merger involves a potential entrant or a recent entrant with a small market share.
(ii) If one or more parties are important innovators that is not reﬂected in market share.
(iii) If there are signiﬁcant cross-shareholdings among the market participants.
(iv) If one of the merging ﬁr m si sam a v e r i c kﬁrm with a high likelihood of disrupting
coordinated conduct.
(v) If indications of past or ongoing coordination, or facilitating practices, are present.
(vi) If one of the merging parties has a pre-merger market share of 50% or more.
2than 250, or a HHI of greater than 2000 and an increase in HHI greater than
150, are likely to raise competitive concerns and be investigated. In diﬀerenti-
ated goods the Commission, in addition to the HHI would also encourage the
estimation of cross price elasticities or diversion ratios (sales lost due to one
product due to a price change in another). Yet, even though it was recognised
that the HHI would give an imperfect indication of the intensity of competi-
tion in diﬀerentiated product market, they still felt that concentrations leading
to a limited combined market share would be unlikely to result in a level of
economic power that could impede competition signiﬁcantly. This use of the
dominance test as a necessary condition is debatable. We provide an example
in this paper that shows that a potential merger in undertakings with limited
combined market share can result in a substantial increase in market power.
New EC Merger Regulation No 139/2004 addresses this point by introducing a
substantive test to make it clear that all post-merger scenarios posing a threat
to competition would be captured by the screening process.4 We propose the
use of a simple structural approach in diﬀerentiated products industries to un-
dertake a substantive test of changes in market power that arise from mergers
of undertakings. We estimate company (product) mark-ups using a “simple”
Nested Logit model based on Berry (1994) and a more “sophisticated” model
pioneered by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). Using an industry study as
an example, we argue that the use of Herﬁndal-Hirschmann Index in merger
screening, using company output (sales), will fail to identify some damaging
mergers. We propose one should use simple (or advanced) structural models
to back-out estimates of company (by product) market power in diﬀerentiated
products industries. The use of Herﬁndal-Hirschmann Index using estimates of
company proﬁt shares (rather than market shares), would help to identify dam-
aging mergers, particularly amongst smaller companies. While the dominance
test may fail to identify damaging mergers in diﬀerentiated products industries
our “simple” structural methodology technique will not. We propose it should
be used a part of a substantive test to identify all anti-competitive mergers,
even among small in market share undertakings.
4Turnover thresholds, or other criteria , may result in a merger been assessed in an individ-
ual EU country. Most individual EU countries still rely strongly on the dominance test. The
European Commission has exclusive jurisdiction for mergers between ﬁrms with a combined
worldwide turnover of at least 5 billion euros and a turnover within the European Economic
Area of more than 250 million euros for each of them. If the companies concerned have more
than two-thirds of their European turnover in one and same EU country, the merger is exam-
ined by the competition authority of that country because the latter is better placed than the
Commission to examine its potential eﬀects.
3We base our example on the Industry and data outlined in section 2. In sec-
tion 3 we outline a “simple” structural methodology to estimate mark-ups based
on Mariuzzo, Walsh and Whelan (2003), a nested logit model of demand, with
an estimation procedure based on Berry (1994). We also outline a comparable
but more “sophisticated” model of demand (and supply) based on Mariuzzo,
Walsh and Whelan (2004), using the estimation procedure in Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995) (BLP). Section 4 we compare our results and estimates of
mark-ups from both these procedures. We illustrate the beneﬁts of using a
structural approach (substantive test) over and above a simple market share
analysis (dominance test) in the screening stage of a merger by undertaking a
hypothetical merger in our data. Finally, we summarize our main conclusions
in section 5.
2 Industry and Data
AC Nielsen, an international marketing research company, has collated a panel
database of all brands in Carbonated Soft Drinks distributed throughout all
12,000 Irish retail stores for use in our empirical analysis. The database pro-
vides bi-monthly population data spanning October 1992 to March 1997 for 178
brands, identiﬁed for 13 ﬁrms and 40 product characteristics within the partic-
ular “business” of Carbonated Soft Drinks. The data record the retail activities
of both Irish and Foreign owned brands/ﬁrms selling throughout the stores of
the Irish retail sector. The evolution of the Irish grocery market from the early
1970s to its present day structure is described in Walsh and Whelan (1999).
We have brand level information on the per litre brand price (weighted av-
erage of brand unit prices across all stores selling the brand, weighted by brand
sales share within the store), quantity (thousand litres), sales value (thousand
pounds), store coverage (based on pure counts of stores, and size weighted by
store size in terms of carbonated drinks in which the brand retails to measure ef-
fective coverage), inventories (number of days to stock out on day of audit given
the current rate of purchases), ﬁrm attachment and product (ﬂavor, packaging,
diet) characteristics.
An interesting feature of the AC Nielsen data is their identiﬁcation of vari-
ous product characteristics within the market for Carbonated Soft Drinks, which
group clusters of brands by 40 characteristics: 4 ﬂavors (Cola, Orange, Lemon-
ade and Mixed Fruit), 5 diﬀerent packaging types (Cans, Standard Bottle, 1.5
Litre, 2 Litre and Multi-Pack of Cans) and 2 diﬀerent sweeteners, Diet and
Regular. The number and size of the product characteristics was very stable
4throughout the period of this study. To allow for ﬂavor segments (Cola, Or-
ange, Lemonade and Mixed Fruit) is standard in the analysis of Carbonated
Soft Drinks [see Sutton (1991)]. To see why packaging format is recognized as
a crucial feature of this market, in Figure I we graph the seasonal cycles of


















































































































































Figure I: Bi-Monthly sales of Carbonated Soft Drinks by Packaging Type
Cans peak in the summer months of June and July and 2 Litre bottles sales
peak over the winter months of December and January. One must realize that
90 per cent of cans and standard bottles are distributed through small stores
rather than chain stores. In contrast, the majority of 2 litre and multi-pack
5cans are distributed through chain stores. Firms may, or may not, place brands
across various product characteristics of the market. Details of the product
characteristics and associated number of ﬁrms and brands they host are set out
in Table II.
















Cans         
Regular Cola  2040  8.7  4  7  1.30 
Diet Cola  519  2.3  3  5  1.28 
Regular Orange  848  3.7  4  6  1.34 
Diet Orange  100  0.5  1  3  1.25 
Regular Lemonade  665  3.0  2  4  1.16 
Diet Lemonade  256  1.1  1  2  1.40 
Regular Mixed Fruit  988  4.3  6  8  1.39 
Diet Mixed Fruit  17  0.1  1  2  1.24 
Standard         
Regular Cola  1633  6.3  6  11  1.47 
Diet Cola  417  1.6  2  3  1.27 
Regular Orange  911  3.5  5  13  1.44 
Diet Orange  19  0.1  1  1  1.19 
Regular Lemonade  556  2.2  3  7  1.32 
Diet Lemonade  96  0.3  1  1  1.29 
Regular Mixed Fruit  3137  11.6 7  21  1.26 
Diet Mixed Fruit  19  0.1  1  1  1.15 
1.5 Ltr.         
Regular Cola  640  2.8  3  3  0.67 
Diet Cola  212  0.9  2  4  0.75 
Regular Orange  510  2.2  4  6  0.70 
Diet Orange  51  0.2  1  1  0.71 
Regular Lemonade  892  4.0  2  4  0.60 
Diet Lemonade  394  1.8  1  2  0.71 
Regular Mixed Fruit  447  1.9  6  7  0.75 
Diet  Mixed  Fruit  1 0.02 1  1 0.72 
2 Ltr.         
Regular Cola  1883  7.6  4  5  0.49 
Diet Cola  518  2.1  3  5  0.54 
Regular Orange  1320  5.6  4  5  0.52 
Diet Orange  136  0.6  2  3  0.56 
Regular Lemonade  1851  8.1  2  4  0.46 
Diet Lemonade  671  2.8  1  2  0.57 
Regular Mixed Fruit  2539  10.3 5  9  0.48 
Diet Mixed Fruit  21  0.1  1  1  0.53 
Multipack Cans         
Regular Cola  630  2.5  2  6  0.98 
Diet Cola  206  0.8  2  5  1.05 
Regular Orange  165  0.7  3  5  1.03 
Regular Lemonade  117  0.5  1  2  0.97 
Diet Lemonade  67  0.3  1  2  0.96 
Regular Mixed Fruit  6  0.05 1  1  0.83 
          
  24305 100  100 178   
 
Table II: Bi-Monthly Segment Characteristics, Averaged over Oct.92-May 97
6In Figure II we document company coverage of our forty product character-
istics: product coverage of stores based on pure counts of stores, and eﬀective
product coverage where the store is weighted by its share of Retail Carbonated
Soft Drinks turnover.
Segments:  4 flavour  X  5 packaging types (Cans, Standard, 1.5 Litre, 2 Litre, and Cans Multipacks)
1-5:       Cola Regular  X 5 packaging   21-25:    Cola Diet  X 5 packaging
6-10:     Orange Regular  X 5 packaging 26-30: Orange Diet  X 5 packaging
11-15:   Lemonade Regular  X 5 packaging 31-35:    Lemonade Diet  X 5 packaging
16-20:   Mixed Fruit Regular X 5 packaging 36-40:    Mixed Fruit Diet X 5 packaging
Figure II: Company Coverage of Stores by Product Segment
We undertake our analysis by comparing the top two companies, Coca-Cola
Bottlers (Coca-Cola Co. franchise) and C&C (Pepsico franchise), with the group
of smaller companies (mainly Irish/British owned). The top two companies
7have broad coverage of the product segments. We see that store coverage is
not company but product speciﬁc. For example, Coca-Cola Bottlers clearly
has wide distribution with Regular Cola Cans (segment 1). As we move up
regular Cola segments by package size, to segments 4 and 5, the number of stores
covered declines dramatically, but eﬀective store coverage declines by much less:
distribution is targeted at big shops. While these trends are true across other
ﬂavors owned by Coca-Cola, both regular and diet, we see that distribution is
less aggressive in regular Orange and Mixed Fruit characteristics ( segments
6-10 and 15-20). This is where competition from the small companies is greater
(see product distribution of all other companies in Figure II). The important
point for our econometric analysis is that (eﬀective) store coverage is product
(brand) and not company speciﬁc.
3 Estimating Market Power
There is a long history of mapping market share structure into market power.5
In the case of a non-cooperative Cournot oligopoly homogeneous good industry


















where sj is the ﬁrm j market share, η denotes the industry demand elasticity,
p is the industry price and cj is the marginal cost ﬁrm j faces. Market power in
an industry with homogenous goods is directly and positively linearly related to
the HHI. While the HHI may be a good rule of thumb to use in deciding whether
or not to investigate mergers in homogenous industries, once one introduces
diﬀerentiated goods, mapping HHI to market power becomes more problematic.
In diﬀerentiated products industries, market share is no longer a good ap-
proximation of the ability to mark-up price over cost. The market is now made
up of a number of products that are diﬀerentiated, either by location or some
product attributes. Some products are more similar than others in terms of these
attributes. The competitive constraint on a ﬁrm’s pricing is now determined by
the degree of substitutability between the various goods in the market. Things
become even more complex in the case that ﬁrms produce multiple products
5This idea is evident with the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of Bain in the
1950s, positing a one-way mapping from structure (concentration of market share) to conduct
(treated as a ’black box) to performance (average price-cost mark-up across companies in an
industry).
8in the market. Firms may specialize in producing goods with very similar at-
tributes, or have a portfolio of goods with very diﬀerent attributes, and may or
may not locate alongside other multi-product ﬁrms producing similar or diﬀer-
ent goods. The HHI for the market tells us little about the underlying structure
of such markets or the market power of ﬁrms. Firms with small market share
may well be able to extract high price-cost mark-ups by being specialised in
their product characteristics and location. The question now arises as to how
we may map this complexity of multi-product ﬁrms operating over product
characteristics and locations into market power?
In order to evaluate market power where products are diﬀerentiated, it is
necessary to estimate the degree of substitutability between the various goods
in the market. However, estimating demand for diﬀerentiated products has a
dimensionality problem. A linear demand system for J brands has J2 price
parameters to estimate. One must therefore place some structure on the esti-
mation. A number of alternative demand speciﬁcations have been developed to
deal with this dimensionality problem by reducing the dimensionality space into
a product space. We focus our attention in this paper on the discrete choice
models in product characteristics used in estimating demand for diﬀerentiated
products, which allow for consumer heterogeneity (including consumer taste for
location).6
3.1 Nested Logit Model of Demand
Berry (1994) uses a nested logit model to estimate diﬀerentiated demand sys-
tems. His main contribution is to correct for possible price endogeneity, due to
t h ef a c tt h a tr e s e a r c h e r sn e v e ro b s e r v ea l l product characteristics. This was the
approach undertaken in Mariuzzo, Walsh and Whelan (2003), where they esti-
mated the brand price-cost mark-ups for Irish retail carbonated soft drinks (and
subsequently ﬁrm market power by aggregating over ﬁrms’ brands) on product
characteristics, prices, and the log of within group share. They enriched the
model by allowing for the location convenience dimension. In what follows we
outline their model.
The nested logit model has a demand equation that is based on a random-
utility model in which an individual consumes one unit of the product that
yields the highest utility, where products include the outside good. As opposed
to the ordinary logit model, the j brands or products are partitioned into G+1
6As an alternative one could use representative consumer choice. These models include
t h eD i s t a n c eM e t r i cm o d e l( P i n k s e ,S l a d ea n dB r e t t ,2 0 0 2 ;P i n k s ea n dS l a d e2 0 0 2 ) ,o rt h e
Multi-Stage Budgeting model (Hausman, Leonard and Zona, 1994).
9groups, g =0 ,1,,G, with the outside good j the only one present in group 0.
We use the 40 segments outlined in Table II. We deﬁne the utility of consumer
i for product j that faces no transportation costs and for consumer l that faces
a transportation cost t, respectively as,
uij = xjβ − αpj + ξj + ζig +( 1− σ)εij
ulj = xjβ − α1 (pj + t)+ξj + ζlg +( 1− σ)εlj (2)
where xj is a vector of observed characteristics of product j; pj is the price of
product j (we allow for a diﬀerent response from the two consumer groups) and
t is a per unit disutility; and ξj is a vector of unobserved, to the econometrician,
product characteristics. The variation in consumer tastes enters only through
the terms ζig = ζlg, εij and εlj. εij and εlj are speciﬁc to product j,w h i c h
is assumed to be an identically and independently distributed extreme value.
For consumers, ζig is utility common to all products within a group g and has
a distribution function that depends on σ,w i t h0≤ σ < 1. As the parameter
σ approaches one, the within group correlation of utility levels across products
goes to one (products within groups are perfect substitutes). As σ tends to zero,
so too does the within group correlation.7 We aggregate over fraction (1 − Dj)
of consumers i, and aggregate over the fraction Dj of consumers k to deﬁne the
unknown parameter vector δ (describing the mean utility level of a product),8
δj = xjβ − αpj +( α − α1)pj ∗ ln(Dj) − β1ln(Dj)+ξj (3)
As shown in Berry (1994), from equation (3) we can derive the product
market shares which depend upon the mean utility level of a product, and we
can treat these mean utility levels as known non-linear transformations of market
7When σ = 0 this reduces to the ordinary logit model, where substitution possibilities are
completely symmetric, for example as when all products belong to the same group.
8Our empirical proxy for Dj, or distance to a product, is one minus the eﬀective product
coverage of stores. That is to say, rather than just taking the percentage of the 12,000 stores
that carry brand j, we take a weighted sum where each store is weighted by its share of
Carbonated Soft Drink sales in the market to get a measure of eﬀective coverage. The greater
the eﬀective product coverage of stores, the higher the fraction of consumers that face no
transportation costs in buying the product (which, at a product level, can be interpreted
as lower distance to the product). The property of the nested logit model that leads to
independence of irrelevant nested alternatives will thus be partly relaxed.We use ln(Dj)i n
our econometric work. The fraction of the consumer populations with transportation costs
will thus be ln(Dj)/(ln(Dj)+( 1− ln(Dj))) and without transportation costs will be (1 −
(ln(Dj))/(ln(Dj)+( 1− ln(Dj))).
10shares such that δj can be written as the following linear demand equation,
ln(sj) − ln(s0)=xjβ − αpj +( α − α1)pj ∗ ln(Dj) − β1ln(Dj)+σ ln(sjg)+ξj
(4)
where sj is product j’s (the brand) share of the entire market (inside plus
outside goods total). We deﬁn et h ee n t i r em a r k e ta st h es u mo fc a r b o n a t e d
sales over all brands (inside goods) and total sales of the outside good, as 330ml
carbonates per day for the population of Ireland.9 The outside goods’ share of
the entire market is s0.T h ev a r i a b l eDj can also be interpreted as the distance
t oap r o d u c tj.l n ( Dj) ∗ pj augments the price eﬀect by our distance measure
per product. sjg is j’s segment share of the group g to which it belongs. We
need estimates of αj =( α +( α − α1) ∗ ln(Dj)) and σ to get our corresponding



















if k 6= j and j,k ∈ g
εjk = αkpksk if k 6= j and k/ ∈ g (5)
It is important to note that the elasticities here refer to the percentage change
in market share in response to a change in pk. Estimates of αj and σ from
equation (4) are obtained using instrumental variables since the product price
and the within group share are endogenous variables and must be instrumented.
We estimate the demand side primitives and, via an equilibrium pricing
system of equations, to be deﬁned, we can back out the price cost mark-up
(Lerner Index) for each brand. Firms maximize the sum of proﬁts accruing
from ﬁrm brands, fj. In brand price setting, pj,aﬁrm takes the price of all
other ﬁrms’ brands as given. The ﬁrm internalizes the cross-price eﬀect on
market share of the brands it owns in the price setting of an individual brand.







=0 b,j ∈ fj (6)
Given marginal costs cj, a multi-product Nash equilibrium is given by the
system of J ﬁrst order conditions.10 Given the primitives of the demand system
9This is a reasonable approximation. It should be noted that the largest bi-monthly car-
bonated sales in our data is equivalent to each person in Ireland consuming 220ml per day.
10We assume that a Nash equilibrium exists. Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991) prove existence for
a general discrete choice model, assuming single product ﬁrms. Anderson and de Palma (1992)
prove existence for the nested logit model with multiproduct ﬁrms, assuming symmetry.
11we will be able to calculate a mark-up for each brand. Even though we impose
no structure on marginal cost, the primitives are likely to be estimated with
error so in this approach we will back out a mark-up with error.
For simplicity, one can assume single product price settings and symmetry










/(1 − σsjg − (1 − σ)sj)
¸
(7)
The markup depends in this particular case upon the substitution parameter
σ and within group share. The bigger the within group product share the higher
will the product price-cost markup. If σ = 0 (no segmentation) we have the
ordinary logit result, such that the mark-up depends on product market share,
sj, and not within group market shares. The eﬀect of the location convenience
enters into the αj parameter and forces us to adopt a matrix notation to solve
for the markup. We refer to relations (13-14) in the next subsection for a more
general computation of mark-ups (which is the one we use in our estimates).
3.2 BLP Approach
Going a step further, one may extend the analysis to adopt a fully structural
approach to estimating market power by specifying a cost function to be esti-
mated,
ln(cj)=wjβ + ωj (8)
where wj is a vector of observed product characteristics, and ωj is a vector
of product characteristics that are unobservable to the econometrician. BLP
propose the simultaneous estimation of a demand equation with a speciﬁed
supply equation.11
BLP has a demand equation based on a random utility model in which
individuals consume the product that give them the highest utility (including
the utility for the outside option). We write individual i indirect utility for
product j as
uij = −α1pj + x1












11Employing a fully structural approach has the advantage that one can, other than gaining
eﬃciency, undertake various counterfactuals.
12where x1 are observed product characteristics that enter linearly in our esti-
mates, whereas x2 those that enter nonlinearly, in our model the constant and
prices. The subscripts A,C,N stand for, Age, Closeness,a n dNormal distribu-
tion, respectively, which individualise our consumers (observed and unobserved)
characteristics. This three − upla deﬁnes each consumer taste for quality and
sensitivity to prices (product characteristics that enter x2). The assumption
that individuals react to a price change diﬀerently when product j is present
in their nearest store compared to the case when it is not underlies the sensi-
tivity to price. Some of the product characteristics (ξj) are unobserved to us
but are observed by our consumers in their choices. We use proper instruments
to control for their correlation with prices and store coverage, two endogenous
variables.12 Equation (9) shows that the indirect utility function can be decom-
posed in a mean utility δj and a deviation from the mean µij.T h i sl a t t e rt e r m
represents the main diﬀerence from the previous model.
Our utility for the outside good is written as,
ui0t = ξ0t |{z}
δ0t
+ σ0νi0 | {z }
µiot
+ ²i0t (10)
We normalize ξ0t = σ0 = 0. Finally, {α,β,σ} are the parameters of the
demand that are going to be estimated.
The BLP speciﬁcation of demand allows diﬀerent individuals to have diﬀer-
ent tastes for diﬀerent product characteristics. In addition, the model can allow
for consumer heterogeneity in terms of their response to prices. The random
coeﬃcients are designed to capture variations in the substitution patterns.
Aggregating over the error component one recovers a logistic form that de-
ﬁnes the probability that individual i buys product j (φij(·)). The next step
is to aggregate over individuals and calculate each product’s estimated market
shares. The non-closed solution of this integral requires the use of a simulation
procedure. In addition, the computation of the optimal parameters requires
the use of a contracting mapping technique together with a non linear two-
step GMM estimator. Although more realistic than the logit or nested logit
model, the estimation procedure is not so straightforward. Estimation requires
simulation and numerical methods. We refer to BLP for details regarding the
computational method.
12In the table of results we outline the set of instruments that we use to jointly estimate
demand and supply.
13Given the number of consumers in the economy I and integrating over the
distributions of individual characteristics we derive each brand demand function
as,
qj (·)=Isj (p,x,ξ;θ), for j ∈ J (11)





(pj − cj)qj (12)
the maximization of which leads to the ﬁrst order conditions in (6),
from which we get our price equilibria.




∂pj , if brands b,j ∈ Jf are produced by the same ﬁrm
0, otherwise.
(13)
which allows us to write the following price-cost mark-up explicitly as,
p = c + ∆−1s | {z }
markup
(14)
Our interest in substitution eﬀects is captured by the own and cross-price



















































where ni, ai, ci are, respectively, simulated values from Normal, Age and
Closeness (to shops) distributions.13
13See Mariuzzo, Walsh and Whelan (2004) for details on these simulations.
14Unfortunately, as noticed by Berry Levinsohn and Pakes (2003) and Petrin
(2002), a reliance on the market-level distributions of consumer characteristics,
do not give us the degrees of freedom associated with micro-level data on indi-
vidual choices. Moreover, the distribution of consumer characteristics relevant
to products inside the market may well be diﬀerent to those purchasing the out-
side option (see Mariuzzo, 2004). Likewise the distribution of relevant consumer
characteristics may also vary dramatically across products inside the market.
In our example we improve our estimates of demand primitives by randomizing
over data on store coverage to create a distribution of consumer disutility re-
ﬂecting distance to each brand (product). We have a distribution of consumer
preferences that reﬂects the likely convenience of the location of retail stores
that carry the product in question. The interaction of this product (j) speciﬁc
distribution with prices can be estimated with far greater degrees of freedom
when compared to interactions using market level distributions of consumer
characteristics. This will result in a very rich set of demand primitives. The
more traditional form of product diﬀerentiation, consumer taste for location,
turns out to be important. Within a structural model of equilibrium we allow
for product diﬀerentiation on two dimensions, distribution of consumer tastes
for product characteristics and location convenience.
4 Comparing Results of Nested Logit and BLP
Models
We estimate the Nested Logit demand system in equation (4). Estimates of the
vector β, β1, α, α1,a n dσ can be obtained from a GMM estimation procedure.
The variables pj,l n ( Dj)∗pj and ln(sj/g) are endogenous variables and must be
instrumented. Our results are presented in Table III.
15Dependent Variable: ln(Sj) – ln(S0)            I  II 
  Coefficient     (t-stat)  Coefficient     (t-stat) 
    
Constant      -0.8            (1.0)      -3.7            (10.1)* 
Default Cola    
Orange       1.1           (12.5)*       0.59         (9.6)* 
Lemonade       0.14          (1.6)      -0.01         (0.2) 
Mixed Fruit       0.45          (5.3)*       0.04         (0.6) 
Default Cans    
Standard       2.7          (7.9)*       1.2            (6.7)* 
1.5 Litre       3.4          (9.7)*       1.7            (8.9)* 
2 Litre      -0.3         (1.1)      -0.11          (0.7) 
Multi-Pack Cans       0.2         (0.5)       0.8            (3.8)* 
Default Regular    
Diet       2.2         (3.5)*       1.6           (4.2)* 
-β1 ln(Djt)         1.2          (9.6)* 
σ  ln(sgjt)
 a       0.91       (13.1)*       0.65         (9.6)* 
(α-α1) ln(Djt) pjt
 a         0.63         (7.5)* 
-α pjt
a       5.9          (9.1)*       2.9           (7.4)* 
Company Dummies               Yes               Yes 
Packaging × Month Dummies               Yes               Yes 
R
2              0.61                0.81 
Numbers of Observations              4,645               4,645 
Over-identification IV Test        χ
2 (5) = 0.99      χ
2 (5) = 0.99 
a Instruments for Regression I include all the regressors, with the exception of pjt and  ln(sgjt)t.  Inventoriesjt; 
Hausman-Taylor instrumental variables (brands of the same firm in other segments) with respect to pjt, and 
Inventoriesjt; and BLP instruments (brands of the other firms in the same segment) with respect to mean and 
standard deviation of Inventoriesj 
Instruments for Regression II include all the regressors, with the exception of pjt , ln(sgjt) and ln(Djt)pjt.  
Inventoriesjt; Hausman-Taylor instrumental variables (brands of the same firm in other segments) with 
respect to pjt, ln(Djt), and Inventoriesjt; and BLP instruments (brands of the other firms in the same segment) 
with respect to mean and standard deviation of ln(Djt) and Inventoriesj. *Significantly different from zero at 
the five percent level in a two-tailed test.
 
 
Table III: GMM Estimation of the Nested Logit Demand System
In column I we present a nested logit model using no data on distance
(location convenience) in the regression or in the instrument set. In column II we
estimate the full model in equation (4). In both speciﬁcations, the Chi-squared
test rejects the null that the moments (instruments) are invalid. We estimate
αj =( −2.9+.63 ∗ ln(Dj)). This implies from equation (5) that corresponding
nested logit own-price and cross-price elasticities will be augmented by product
speciﬁc share of consumers that have distance to the product14.I n a d d i t i o n ,
14These estimates are slightly diﬀerent compared to Mariuzzo, Walsh and Whelan (2003) as
we use packaging X month dummies instead of packaging X season dummies. In addition we
16we estimate σ =0 .65, for our corresponding nested logit own-price and cross-
price elasticities, this will imply that within segment market shares will get a
higher weight than the overall market share. These estimates provide a matrix
of nested logit own-price and cross-price elasticities, of which there are J2 in
each bi-monthly period.
The results of the BLP procedure, jointly estimating the demand and cost
equations are presented in Tables IV.
   Demand  Cost 
  Variables  Coefficient   (t-stat)  Coefficient   (t-stat) 
Means      
  Constant  -6.2  (6.1)*  0.13  (.70) 
  Inventories    -.20   (2.7)* 
  Store Coverage   .11    (2.8)* 
  α1 Price  -7.3  (6.8)*   
Default Cola  Orange  1.3  (15.6)*  .02   (.40) 
  Lemonade  .69   (6.4)*  .16   (2.7)* 
  Mixed Fruit  1.7  (6.5)*  -.22   (2.9)* 
Default Cans  Standard  4.5  (3.6)*  .33   (3.2)* 
  1.5 Litre  4.8  (3.5)*  .39   (5.1)* 
  2 Litre  .78  (3.4)*  -1.1  (4.3)* 
  Multi-Pack Cans    -3.4  (12.2)*  -1.2   (6.2)* 
Default Diet  Regular   .71  (11.8)*  .08   (1.3) 
      
Interactions      
Parametric Distribution  Constant   3.4   (3.4)*   
  α2 Price  -0.65   (.61)   
Age Distribution  Constant   -11.6   (2.8)*   
  α3 Price  -2.1   (0.32)   
“Closeness to Stores” 
Distribution 
Constant   29.1  (18.6)*   
  α4 Price  -11.2    (7.8)*   
R
2
    .82   
GMM Objective    .0073   
# Negative Predicted Mark-Ups      0 
# of Simulations    100   
Demand and Cost Side include Firm and Packaging X Month Dummies. Observations 4,645.  
Instruments for Demand: Flavour, Packaging and Diet characteristics and Inventories; 
Hausman-Taylor instrumental variables (brands of the same firm in other segments) with 
respect to price, store coverage and inventories; and BLP instruments (brands of the other 
firms in the same segment) with respect the Mean and Standard Deviation of store coverage 
and inventories. Instruments for Supply: Same as demand expect the Hausman-Taylor 
instrumental variables. 
 
Table IV: Estimation of Demand and MC Equation: BLP Speciﬁcation
The standard errors have been corrected for potential correlation between
demand and supply unobservables. With reference to utility, we estimate the
mean eﬀect of our product characteristics, the coeﬃcient on price, the parame-
ters that deﬁne individual variability in taste for a benchmark quality and price,
the interaction terms. Our speciﬁcation of the utility and cost function, choices
of demand and supply side instruments and our structural model of equilibrium
use a diﬀerent set of instruments. This makes our nested logit model including the interaction
term for distance to a product comparable to the Demand modle of BLP.
17produce good results, we predict 80 per cent of the variation in the actual mar-
ket share of each product in each time period. It is important that we get good
estimates of the demand primitives. The coeﬃcient on price and interaction
of price with consumer taste distributions will be the focal point. Yet, it will
be the quality of the other controls and the instrument set that will give us
eﬃcient estimates of our coeﬃcients on price and consumer taste distributions
interactions with price. These determine our estimates of the own-price and
cross-price elasticities (15). The coeﬃcient on price and the interaction of price
with our consumer taste distributions that reﬂect consumer taste for closeness
are highly signiﬁcant. The market level consumer taste distributions interac-
tions with price are not signiﬁcant. This will imply that own and cross-price
elasticities will be more responsive when the distribution of consumers distance
to stores that carry the product reﬂects closeness to consumers. We see clearly
at r a d eo ﬀ between covering the market and the nature of price competition
that a brand faces. Less coverage is not a good attribute in terms of market
share but can potentially lead to higher price cost mark-ups by making own-
and- cross price elasticities less responsive to the prices of other brands. Even
though the market level interactions do not come in, we see that our product
level consumer taste distribution for geography induces rich demand primitives.
In Table V we compare the demand primitives that come out of the Nested
Logit demand system and the BLP demand model, estimated jointly with sup-
ply.15
15*Nested Logit Demand Model; **BLP Demand and Supply Model
18Segment  Own Price 
 Elasticity * 




 Elasticity ** 
Sum of  
Cross Price 
Elasticity** 
Cola Cans  -13.408  2.9194  -13.296  6.63 
Cola Standard  -11.384  2.4329  -8.3307  3.5272 
Cola 1.5 Litre  -5.8557  1.3155  -6.3414  5.6982 
Cola  2 Litre  -4.1667  0.82662  -5.4398  7.1344 
Cola Cans Multipacks  -7.9963  1.7595  -9.8501  6.8057 
Orange Cans  -11.621  2.5775  -13.45  6.9458 
Orange Standard  -11.315  2.4595  -14.791  7.2123 
Orange 1.5 Litre  -5.8679  1.2974  -8.2648  7.9649 
Orange 2 Litre  -4.4812  0.93835  -6.0833  7.4632 
Orange Cans Multipacks  -8.8926  2.0043  -12.798  8.3505 
Lemonade Cans  -8.9282  2.0273  -7.2687  4.5024 
Lemonade Standard  -11.926  2.6369  -15.899  8.1024 
Lemonade 1.5 Litre  -5.6547  1.2635  -5.7796  5.7165 
Lemonade 2 Litre  -3.9762  0.81921  -5.2258  7.1708 
Lemonade Cans Multipacks  -8.1858  1.8823  -6.8013  4.7672 
Mixed Fruit Cans  -12.276  2.7094  -16.43  8.2662 
Mixed Fruit Standard  -14.400  2.9623  -12.723  6.2424 
Mixed Fruit  1.5 Litre  -6.3776  1.4034  -8.2566  6.6438 
Mixed Fruit 2 Litre  -4.0611  0.73015  -5.4653  6.9214 
Mixed Fruit Cans Multipacks  -5.3052  1.2756  -9.4387  6.0243 
Diet Segments      
Cola Cans  -11.817  2.6649  -11.757  6.4163 
Cola Standard  -12.303  2.8268  -15.268  8.3488 
Cola 1.5 Litre  -5.7972  1.3042  -5.023  3.5868 
Cola  2 Litre  -4.2643  0.93494  -6.3843  7.6129 
Cola Cans Multipacks  -8.7069  1.9573  -12.888  8.173 
Orange Cans  -10.997  2.6402  -14.889  8.5435 
Orange Standard  -9.9561  2.3916  -14.792  8.0678 
Orange 1.5 Litre  -5.4339  1.3054  -8.4619  8.2154 
Orange 2 Litre  -4.6477  1.0488  -6.9119  7.4193 
Lemonade Cans  -13.181  3.0485  -9.5058  4.6999 
Lemonade Standard  -12.029  2.883  -15.778  8.3728 
Lemonade 1.5 Litre  -6.9400  1.6513  -8.5238  8.0661 
Lemonade 2 Litre  -4.7671  1.0658  -3.9351  4.2408 
Lemonade Cans Multipacks  -7.5778  1.8211  -11.733  7.9479 
Mixed Fruit Cans  -9.0504  2.0883  -14.292  8.1215 
Mixed Fruit Standard  -9.2219  2.1273  -14.234  8.4596 
Mixed Fruit 1.5 Litre  -4.8644  1.4551  -6.8668  7.4791 
Mixed Fruit 2 Litre  -4.1952  1.0073  -11.757  6.4163 
 
Table V: Segment (Weighted Averages over Brands) 1992-1997
We average over the brands within each of our ﬂavor, packaging and diet seg-
ments. This in turn is averaged over our 28 bi-monthly periods. The elasticity
of market share with respect to the own-price elasticities are similar in trends
for both models. The BLP estimates tend to be more elastic. In addition, both
models estimate that the own price elasticity is more elastic for Cans relative to
other packaging types, while 2-litre packing is the most inelastic. We also report
the sum of the cross-price elasticities for each brand, averaged by segment. The
BLP model clearly estimates these to be larger.
19Given these primitives, assuming multi-product price setting ﬁrms without
symmetry in the market, a multi-product Nash equilibrium is given by the sys-
tem of J ﬁrst order conditions. Using the ﬁrst order conditions in equation
(6), one can get estimates of a Lerner Index per brand/product j. Aggregating
these estimates over diﬀerent sets of brands gives an indicator of ﬁrm or segment
market power. In Table VI we compare estimates of bi-monthly mark-ups and
proﬁts, averaged over the period, by segment. The key characteristic is pack-
aging type. Packaging with 1.5 and 2-litre bottles earns greater markups than
cans and the standard bottle. Diet drinks seem to also get a premium and the
mark-ups are very similar when one compares the simple and more sophisticated
frameworks.
*Nested Logit Demand Model 


















Cola Cans  4.22  1.43  0.05  93.50  0.09  185.31 
Cola Standard  3.78  1.26  0.07  112.22  0.10  167.56 
Cola 1.5 Litre  2.53  0.75  0.12  77.99  0.16  103.19 
Cola  2 Litre  11.1  0.50  0.19  364.01  0.22  435.13 
Cola Cans Multipacks  1.92  0.96  0.14  89.51  0.14  83.62 
Orange Cans  1.85  1.38  0.07  59.18  0.08  67.11 
Orange Standard  2.10  1.27  0.07  67.52  0.08  72.22 
Orange 1.5 Litre  2.22  0.68  0.14  73.98  0.13  69.35 
Orange 2 Litre  8.51  0.46  0.22  281.45  0.20  270.2 
Orange Cans Multipacks  0.49  0.97  0.12  20.10  0.11  19.12 
Lemonade Cans  1.41  1.41  0.06  39.91  0.09  61.4 
Lemonade Standard  1.38  1.16  0.11  57.89  0.09  52.43 
Lemonade 1.5 Litre  3.75  0.71  0.13  119.56  0.17  151.19 
Lemonade 2 Litre  11.8  0.47  0.25  447.55  0.23  429.55 
Lemonade Cans Multipacks  0.36  0.97 0.15  19.18  0.13  15.36 
Mixed Fruit Cans  2.13  1.39  0.06  63.92  0.07  71.1 
Mixed Fruit Standard  6.29  1.37  0.07  175.61  0.07  208.64 
Mixed Fruit  1.5 Litre  1.80  0.74  0.15  62.42  0.12  56.62 
Mixed Fruit 2 Litre  18.8  0.41  0.25  666.68  0.22  565.8 
Mixed Fruit Cans Multipacks 0.02  0.83  0.15  0.89  0.28  1.05 
Diet Segments           
Cola Cans  1.11  1.39  0.08  43.44  0.09  47.23 
Cola Standard  0.93  1.30  0.07  30.61  0.11  43.84 
Cola 1.5 Litre  0.83  0.75  0.13  28.42  0.16  35.33 
Cola  2 Litre  2.85  0.55  0.24  130.86  0.22  118.13 
Cola Cans Multipacks  0.63  0.6  0.15  32.02  0.14  27.56 
Orange Cans  0.23  1.27  0.08  9.02  0.07  7.64 
Orange Standard  0.05  1.19  0.10  1.67  0.26  1.68 
Orange 1.5 Litre  0.21  0.71  0.15  7.88  0.13  6.56 
Orange 2 Litre  0.72  0.56  0.18  26.13  0.18  23.89 
Lemonade Cans  0.53  1.44  0.08  20.22  0.08  22.5 
Lemonade Standard  0.21  1.29  0.08  7.76  0.10  9.91 
Lemonade 1.5 Litre  1.62  0.73  0.14  56.39  0.18  66 
Lemonade 2 Litre  3.40  0.59  0.19  133.94  0.22  141.25 
Lemonade Cans Multipacks  0.21  0.96 0.16  11.49  0.13  8.71 
Mixed Fruit Cans  0.04  1.27  0.09  1.49  0.09  1.59 
Mixed Fruit Standard  0.04  1.17  0.09  1.51  0.08  1.31 
Mixed Fruit 1.5 Litre  0.01  0.83  0.14  0.08  0.54  0.22 
Mixed Fruit 2 Litre  0.11  0.55  0.20  4.45  0.22  4.78 
 
Table VI: Segment (Weighted Averages over Brands).
20In Table VII we compare estimates of bi-monthly mark-ups and proﬁts,
averaged over the period, by company. Again the mark-ups are very similar
when one compares the simple and more sophisticated frameworks.
Companies Brands  Market  Share 
of Output 
Mark-Up* Market  Share 
of Profit* 
Mark-Up** Market  Share 
of Profit** 
Rank 1  51 0.4792  0.15  0.3693  0.14  0.46927 
Rank 2  36 0.2337  0.22  0.2655  0.13  0.20297 
Rank 3  20 0.0928  0.28  0.1326  0.18  0.10642 
Rank 4  4 0.0589 0.30  0.0911  0.25  0.17699 
Rank 5  3 0.0553 0.32  0.0907  0.29  0.02206 
Rank 6  7 0.0343 0.16  0.0285  0.10  0.00947 
Rank 7  3 0.0229 0.05  0.0054  0.05  0.01142 
Rank 8  5 0.0196 0.14  0.0144  0.10  0.00077 
Rank 9  6 0.0028 0.15  0.0022  0.13  0.00018 
Rank 10  1 0.0001 0.10  0.0001  0.10  0.00024 
Rank 11  2 0.0002 0.10  0.0001  0.25  0.00004 
Rank 12  1 0.0002 0.09  0.0001  0.06  0.00014 
Rank13  1 0.0001 0.07  0.0000  0.29  0.46927 
HHI   3014    2420    2892 
 
Merge 4 &5         
New HHI   3079    2585    3048** 
Change 
HHI 
 65    165*    156** 
*Nested Logit Demand Model. ** BLP Demand and Supply Model. 
Table VII: Estimated Company Bi-Monthly Mark-ups.
In Table VII we document the price cost mark-ups and market shares by
company for the retail carbonated soft drinks market using estimates of demand
primitives from our simple nested logit and more sophisticated BLP frameworks.
Clearly a monotonic relationship between market power and market share does
not exist in this industry. Companies with a smaller share of the carbonated
soft drinks market extract rents, within the product segments and stores of
the market they operate in, comparable to that of multinationals who oper-
a t ea c r o s sm o s ts t o r e sa n dp r o d u c ts e g m e n t s . I t ss e e m st h a ti n f e r r i n gm a r k e t
power from the distribution of market shares is ill advised in multi-product ﬁrms
21diﬀerentiated goods industries.
4.1 Implications for EU Merger Control
In Table VII we document the HHI measures of concentration in terms of the
normal output based market share and in terms of a proﬁt based market share
for each company. This is done for the simple nested logit and BLP model. We
take a hypothetical merger in our data, companies ranked 4 and 5, to illustrate
that merger screening based on a dominance test may fail to identify a damaging
merger without any market power considerations. Using the rules outlined in
Table I we observe that both models suggest that the proposed merger between
the companies ranked 4 and 5 should be investigated on the basis of the HHI
on proﬁt shares. This is not the case if one only used information on the
market share of companies output. Using the proﬁt share estimated from the
simple logit framework the post merger HHI is 2585 and the change is 165. The
proposed merger between the companies ranked 4 and 5 should be investigated.
In contrast, the HHI for output post-merger is 3079 and the change due to the
merger is only 65, no merger investigation is recommended. Results from the
BLP framework similarly recommends investigation.
New EC Merger Regulation No 139/2004 calls for a substantive test to en-
sure that all post-merger scenarios posing a threat to competition would be
investigated. We argue that one should use at least a simple structural model
to estimate company mark-ups (aggregated over products) as part of a sub-
stantive test. This framework incorporates multi-product ﬁrm behaviour and
product diﬀerentiation in terms of product characteristics and consumer taste
for location convenience. Any anti-trust authority with good data should be
capable of estimating mark-ups using the simple nested logit model of demand.
Merger screening may fail to identify damaging mergers using the market share
of companies output without any market power considerations. In most indus-
tries we see waves of mergers among small companies that go unchecked. In
diﬀerentiated goods industries such mergers may have competitive implications
and should be checked on the basis of market power, and not market share,
considerations.
5 Conclusions and Recommendations
This paper illustrates that the HHI measures of output concentration is not
a good indicator of market power in diﬀerentiated product industries. The
complex operation of multi-product ﬁrms over diﬀerent segments and stores in
22these industries means that there is no theoretical foundation for the mapping
of market concentration into market power. This clearly has implications for the
use of the HHI on output as a screening device for proposed mergers. We show
a proposed merger between two ﬁrms that has little impact on the overall HHI
measure of output concentration for an industry, and thus would not be likely to
undergo an investigation by anti-trust authorities using dominance tests. Yet,
we show a big increase in market power as the companies, small in output, are
specialized into geographic and/or product segments. In the event that a merger
results from the aggregation over companies with high mark-ups, irrespective of
their overall share in the market, our proﬁt share indicator of market power using
the HHI is clearly desirable in the screening stage of mergers in diﬀerentiated
products industries.
This paper compares a simple to an advanced structural approach in the
estimating market power. Our simple model is straightforward to implement,
not requiring cumbersome estimation procedures or a heavy data burden.16
More importantly the results are similar to that estimated in the BLP model.
Using estimates of market power to construct HHI in proﬁt shares allows more
accurate and informed decisions in the screening stage as to which mergers
should undergo investigation. The wording of the new EC Merger Regulation
No 139/2004 would allow such an approach to be part of a substantive test to
ensure that all post-merger scenarios posing a threat to competition are covered
even if the traditional dominance test fails to identify such a scenario.
16For the use of the structural models using a model of supply and demand (nested logit) in
the investigation stage of a merger, see Ivaldi and Verboven (2000) on the Volvo/Scania case.
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